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We propose a new class of quantum key distribution protocol, that ended up to be robust against
photon number splitting attacks in the weak laser pulse implementations. This protocol comprises
of BB84 protocol and SARG protocol, especially in aspects of controlling classical sifting procedures
of two protocols. The protocol is more secure than both of BB84 protocol and SARG protocol, and
the ultimate limit of robustness in the proposed protocol expands as well than both of them.
PACS numbers: Valid PACS appear here
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocol is the only
physically secure method for the distribution of a secret
key between two distant partners (called Alice and Bob).
The physical secure comes from the well-known facts that
an attacker (called Eve) cannot measure an unknown
quantum state without modifies the state itself, and she
cannot duplicate the state and forward a perfect copy to
Bob. The facts are proved by two principles, “Uncer-
tainty principle” and “No cloning theorem”. BB84 pro-
tocol [2] is the first single-photon QKD protocols, which
use a random string of signal states which, for example,
can be realized as single photons in horizontal, vertical,
right circular or left circular polarization states.
In recent years, several long-distance implementations
of BB84 protocol have been developed, that use pho-
tons as information carriers and optical fibers as quantum
channels. Most often Alice sends to Bob a coherent weak
laser pulse in which she has encoded the bit. In weak
pulses QKD system, there are the pulses which contains
more than one photon with non-negligible probability. It
implies that for these pulses Eve no longer limited by
“No cloning theorem”, and she can perform new types
of attacks to obtain the secret key without introducing
errors. In such the attacks, there are Photon Number
Splitting (PNS) attacks [1][3][5]. Although PNS attacks
are far beyond today’s technology, if one includes them in
the security analysis, the consequences are dramatic and
long-distance weak laser pulse QKD systems no longer
have physical security.
In this paper, we propose a new QKD protocol robust
against PNS attacks, achieved by alternative of BB84
protocol and SARG protocol [5]. The protocol is more
secure than both of BB84 protocol and SARG protocol,
especially long-distance weak laser pulses QKD systems.
The advantage of this protocol is that it is easy to imple-
ment, just because it is composed of an existing quantum
key distribution system, where the classical sifting pro-
cedure is only changed which is easier than making a
perfect single-photon source.
II. PROPOSED PROTOCOL
Our protocol uses four quantum states
Q := {|+ x〉, | − x〉, |+ z〉, | − z〉}
such that |〈ωx|ω′z〉| = 1/√2 with ω, ω′ ∈ {+,−} and
|〈+α| −α〉| = 0 with α ∈ {x, z}. The four states are also
used by BB84 protocol and SARG protocol. | ± x〉 and
|±z〉 denote the eigenvectors of σx and σz with eigenvalue
±1, respectively.
Our protocol contains following phases;
1 Quantum communication phase
Alice selects randomly one of four states |A〉 ∈ Q
and sends |A〉 to Bob. Bob measures either σx or
σz , and gets a state |B〉 ∈ Q. We call |A〉 and |B〉
raw keys.
2 Selecting annoucement phase
Alice performs a procedure, in which she obtains 0
with the probability a, and 1 with the probability
1 − a, and she gets A ∈ {0, 1}. The probability a
is determined uniquely by the length of fiber and
0 ≤ a ≤ 1. If A = 0, go to step 3-1 and 4-1, and
otherwise, go to step 3-2 and 4-2.
3-1 Classical announcement phase (for A = 0)
Alice announces publicly a pair of two states A =
{|A1〉, |A2〉}, such that |A〉 ∈ A and |〈A1|A2〉| = 0.
It means that Alice announces a pair of orthogonal
states.
4-1 Sifting and decoding phase (for A = 0)
When |B〉 ∈ A, they get bits, called sifted keys,
from |A〉 and |B〉 with the convention that | + x〉
and |+ z〉 code for 0 and | − x〉 and | − z〉 code for
1.
When |B〉 /∈ A, they discard their raw keys.
3-2 Classical announcement phase (for A = 1)
Alice selects randomly one of two pairs of states
A = {|A1〉, |A2〉}, such that |A〉 ∈ A and
2|〈A1|A2〉| = 1/
√
2, and announces publicly A to
Bob. It means that Alice announces a pair of
nonorthogonal states.
4-2 Sifting and decoding phase (for A = 1)
When |B〉 /∈ A, Bob obtains |B′〉 from |B〉, such
that |B′〉 ∈ A and |〈B|B′〉| = 1/√2, and they get
sifted keys from |A〉 and |B′〉 with the convention
that | ± x〉 code for 0 and | ± z〉 code for 1.
When |B〉 ∈ A, they discard their raw keys.
Remark 1
BB84 is described as the proposed protocol with a = 1,
and SARG is same as this protocol with a = 0.
III. PHOTON NUMBER SPLITTING ATTACKS
In weak pulses QKD system, Alice sends to Bob a weak
laser pulse in which she has encoded the bit. Each pulse
is a priori in a coherent state of weak intensity, which can
be rewritten as a mixture of Fock states,
∑
n≥0 pn|n〉〈n|,
with the number n of photons distributed according to
the Poissonian statistics of mean µ, pn = e
µ/n! [1][3][5].
Consider now the implementation of the proposed pro-
tocol with weak pulses. Bob’s detector is triggered with
probability, taking into account intensities of weak laser
pulses, channel losses and imperfect detection efficien-
cies. Then, in the absence of Eve, Bob’s raw detection
rate, which is the probability that he detects a photon
per pulse sent by Alice, is given by
Rraw(ηρ) =
∑
n≥1
pn{1− (1 − ηdηρ)n} ≃ ηdηρµ
where ηd is the quantum efficiency of a detector and ηρ
is the channel transmission.
In this case, if we endow Eve with unlimited techno-
logical power within the laws of quantum physics, the
following attacks, named a storage attack and an In-
tercept Resend with Unambiguous Discrimination attack
(shortly an IRUD attack), are possible in principle [5].
(We will explain details of these attacks later.) If Alice
and Bob are connected by a lossy channel (ηρ < 1) and
Eve has a lossless channel (ηρ = 1) which connects Alice
and Bob, Eve performs either attacks on a fraction q of
pulses, that is, she tries as follows:
1. Eve performs a procedure, in which she obtains 0
with the probability q and 1 with the probability
1− q.
2. When she gets 1, she only forwards the pulse to
Bob using her lossless channel. When she gets 0,
she performs one of the two PNS attacks.
The attack probability q depends on both a type of her
attack and the length of lossy channel, such that Alice
and Bob do not notice any change in the expected raw
rate and Eve remains undetected.
A. Storage Attack
We will explain the procedure of a storage attack [3]
in the following.
1. Eve counts the number of photons in the pulse, us-
ing photon number quantum nondemolition mea-
surement. If the pulse contains only one photon,
Eve discards the photon.
2. When Eve detects that it is a multiphoton pulse,
she keeps one of the photons in a quantum memory
and forwards the remaining photons to Bob, using
a perfectly transparent quantum channel, ηρ = 1.
3. By the information in classical announcement
phase, Eve correspondingly measures the photon
stored in her quantum memory.
When Eve applies a storage attack on a fraction q of
the pulses, Bob’s raw detection rate is
RS(q) = (1− q)ηdµ+ q
∑
n≥2
pn{1− (1− ηd)n−1}
≃ (1− q)ηdµ+ qηdp2.
By Lemma 1, her mutual information of the key is
ISPr(q) =
pηdp2
(1− q)ηdµ+ qηdp2 · I
S
a
where
ISa = 1− (1 − a) ·H
(√
2 + 1
2
√
2
)
with H(x) = −x log2 x+ (1 − x) log2(1− x).
Lemma 1 ([4])
Eve is now faced with the problem of detecting two states
(|x〉 and |y〉), having an overlap |〈x|y〉| = χ. Then she ap-
plies the measurement maximizing her information, ob-
taining
I(χ) = 1−H(P )
where P = 12 (1 +
√
1− χ2).
Given ηρ, Eve chooses q such that Rraw(ηρ) = R
S(q)
and her mutual information of the sifted key is
ISTr(ηρ) = (ηρ
−1 − 1) · µ
p2−1 − 1 · I
S
a .
B. Intercept Resend with Unambiguous
Discrimination Attack
An encoded pulse containing three photons is rewritten
as one of the four states
{|Ψ1〉, |Ψ2〉, |Ψ3〉, |Ψ4〉}
=
{|+ x〉⊗3, | − x〉⊗3, |+ z〉⊗3, | − z〉⊗3} .
3In this case, there exist four orthogonal states of three
qubits, |Φ1〉, . . . , |Φ4〉, such that 〈Ψi|Φj〉 = δij 1√2 . There-
fore, we can perform a measurement M, that distin-
guishes unambiguously among |Ψ1〉, . . . , |Ψ4〉, with a
probability of success pok = 1/2.
We will explain the procedure of an IRUD attack [5]
in the following.
1. Eve measures the number of photons and discards
a pulse containing less than three photons.
2. On the pulse containing at least three photons, Eve
performs the measurement M.
3. If the result is conclusive, she sends a new photon
prepared in the good state to Bob using a perfectly
transparent quantum channel. If not conclusive,
Eve discards the result and the pulse.
When Eve applies the IRUD attack on a fraction p of
the pulses, Bob’s raw detection rate and Eve’s mutual
information are
RI(q) = (1− q)ηdµ+ qpok
∑
n≥3
pn{1− (1− ηd)n−2}
≃ (1− q)ηdµ+ qηdpokp3
and
IIPr(q) ≃
qηdpokp3
(1− q)ηdµ+ qηdpokp3 .
When Eve chooses q such that Rraw(ηρ) = R
I(q), her
mutual information of the sifted key is
IITr(ηρ) = (ηρ
−1 − 1) · 1
(pokp3)
−1 − 1.
IV. SECURITY AGAINST PNS ATTACKS
In this section, we evaluate security against PNS at-
tacks with QBER = 0. In proposed protocol, the sifted
key rate, which is the probability that Alice and Bob
share a sifted key per a pulse, is given by
Rsift(a, ηρ) ≃ 1 + a
4
· ηdηρµ.
It is easy to see that security against PNS attacks will
be decreasing the sifted key rate. Therefore, we shall
evaluate a security under the condition that a sifted key
rate is constant regardless of the selecting probability a
[5]. Then, we change µ to
µa =
2
1 + a
· µB
where µB is the mean photon number when using BB84
protocol. In this paper, we use a typical value µB = 0.1.
Eve’s mutual information of the sifted key when she
performs either of two PNS attacks is resprctively
IS(a, ηρ) = (ηρ
−1 − 1) · 12
e−µaµa
− 1 · I
S
a
and
II(a, ηρ) = (ηρ
−1 − 1) · 112
e−µaµa2
− 1
From these equations, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 1
Consider Alice and Bob share a secret key using weal
laser pulse QKD system and our proposed protocol. They
choose the selecting parameter a (0 ≤ a ≤ 1) to minimize
Eve’s mutual information of the shared key.
When Eve performs only the storage attack, the best
paramter is a = 0, that is, they use SARG protocol. On
the other hand, when Eve performs the IRUD attack, the
best is a = 1, that is, they use BB84 protocol.
Proof.
We will prove that the following equations:
∂
∂a
IS(a, ηρ) > 0
∂
∂a
II(a, ηρ) < 0.
We can calculate that
∂
∂a
IS(a, ηρ) = (ηρ
−1 − 1) · ∂
∂a
ISa
f(a)
= (ηρ
−1 − 1) ·
∂
∂aI
S
a · f(a)− ISa · ∂∂af(a)
{f(a)}2
where f(a) = 2e−µaµa − 1.
Suppose that
g(a) =
∂
∂a
ISa · f(a)− ISa ·
∂
∂a
f(a)
= (1− LS)
(
2
e−µaµa
− 1
)
− (a+ (1− a)LS)2µa
′(1− µa)
e−µaµa2
where LS = 1−H
(√
2+1
2
√
2
)
and µa
′ = ∂∂aµa < 0.
Considering LS as variable, we can get
∂
∂LS
g(a) =
e−µaµa2 − 2µa + 2(1− a)µa′(1 − µa)
e−µaµa2
<
2{µa2 − µa + (1− a)µa′(1− µa)}
e−µaµ2a
<
2{µa2 − µa + (1− µa)}
e−µaµ2a
<
2µa(µa − 1)
e−µaµ2a
≤ 0
4FIG. 1: Security against PNS attacks with QBER = 0. In
the area I, Eve performs the storage attack and obtains an
information about the sifted key. In the area II, Eve’s attacks
is shifted to the IRUD attack.
FIG. 2: Security against PNS attacks when Alice and Bob
choose an optimal a. If l ≤ 87.5km, they only use a = 0. If l >
87.5km, they increase a shown in the dotted line. Comparing
with Figure 1, our protocol is more secure against PNS attacks
than both of two protocols.
Therefore, because LS < 0.5, it can be shown that
g(a) > g(a)|LS=0.5
=
µa(2− e−µaµa)− 2(1 + a)µa′(1− µa)
2e−µaµa2
>
µa(1− µa) + (1 + a)µa′(1− µa)
e−µaµa2
= 0
where (1 + a)µa
′ = −(1 + a) 2µB(1+a)2 = −µa.
By ηρ
−1 − 1 ≥ 0, we have ∂∂aIS(a, ηρ) > 0.
Next, suppose that
∂
∂a
II(a, ηρ) = (ηρ
−1 − 1) · −
∂
∂ah(a)
{h(a)}2
where h(a) = 12e−µaµa2 − 1.
Then
∂
∂a
h(a) =
12µa
′(µa − 2)
e−µaµ3a
> 0
because µa
′ < 0 and µa < 2.
Therefore, ∂∂aI
I(a, ηρ) < 0. 
At Figure 1, we show Eve’s maximal mutual informa-
tion of a sifted key when she performs either of two PNS
attacks, as a function of the communication distance.
We use typical values ηρ = 10
−ρ/10, ρ = αl[dB] and
α = 0.25[dB/km], where l is the length of the fiber. We
say that, in the case of l ≥ 100km, the proposed proto-
col with a = 0.5 is better than SARG protocol because
II(0.5, ηρ) ≤ II(1, ηρ).
Second, consider that Alice and Bob choose a to min-
imize Eve’s mutual information when she performs the
most convenient PNS attack, in which her mutual infor-
mation is
IP (a, ηρ) = max{IS(a, ηρ), II(a, ηρ)}.
By Figure 2, we can say that, by choosing an optimal a,
the ultimate limit of robustness is shifted from 100km,
which is the ultimate limit of SARG protocol, to 125km,
which is the longest record among experimental QKD
systems in the world.
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